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Over fifty years since the publication of the Modigliani
and Miller (1958) irrelevance propositions, many studies
have investigated the elusive ‘optimal’ capital structure. This
voluminous literature has predominantly focused on public,
nonfinancial corporations with access to United States or
other international capital markets (Myers, 2001). Notwith-
standing the importance of small and medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs) to national economies, the subject of SME* Corresponding author.
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the literature has been somewhat ameliorated in recent de-
cades, with early studies emerging primarily from the UK
(Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchinson, 1996) and the US
(Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). Subsequent studies have
emerged from a growing number of countries, including
Portugal (Esperanca, Gama, & Gulamhussen, 2003), Belgium
(Heyman, Deloof, & Ooghe, 2008; Manigart & Struyf, 1997),
Spain (Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2007; Sogorb
Mira, 2005), Italy (Giudici & Paleari, 2000), Sweden
(Berggren, Olofsson, & Silver, 2000; Cressy and Olofsson,
1997), Taiwan (Fu, Ke, & Huang, 2002), India (Ghosh,
2007), Germany (Audretsch & Elston, 1997; Elsas &
Krahnen, 1998; Fritsch, 1993), Australia (Cassar &
Holmes, 2003; Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2006), and Ireland
(Mac An Bhaird & Lucey, 2010). Whilst this research has
been extended to comparative international studies (Bancel &
Mittoo, 2004; Daskalakis & Psillaki, 2008; Hall, Hutchinson,
& Michaelas, 2004; Peterson & Schulman, 1987), there isting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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capital structure. Investigation of the influence of culture in
the SME literature has been confined to studies on enterprise
(Gray, 1998) and as a ‘spur’ for innovation and growth
(Bradley & Kennelly, 2008).
Empirical studies of SME financing typically test proposi-
tions of capital structure theories developed in the field of
corporate finance by investigating firm characteristic de-
terminants of short-term, long-term and total debt ratios.
Cross-country comparative studies test similar firm charac-
teristic determinants, although a number of studies examine
other factors, such as the effect of creditor rights and legal
origin (Hall & Jorgensen, 2005) and the effect of legal de-
terminants on external finance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Results from these studies sug-
gest a number of similar inter-country factors in financing
SMEs; for example, Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) conclude
that firm effects are more important than country effects,
attributing similarities in determinants of capital structure to
the commonality of institutional characteristics of the two
countries studied. On the other hand, Hall et al. (2004: p. 726)
find “variations in both capital structure and the determinants
of capital structure between the countries surveyed.. [which]
could well be due to differences in attitudes to borrowing,
disclosure requirements, relationships with banks, taxation and
other national economic, social and cultural differences”.
Whilst the suggestion of potential cultural influence on
SME financing is unusual, culture is a key dimension in many
fields of business and finance. In addition to its influence on
whole financial systems (e.g. Islamic finance), culture has
been shown to impact on commodity and services trade,
corporate transparency, foreign direct investment, mergers
and acquisitions, the modality of market entry, and mana-
gerial control (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004;
Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2007; Grinblatt &
Keloharju, 2001; Harzing & Joseph, 2003; Hitt, Franklin, &
Zhu, 2006; Kaufmann & O’Neill, 2007; Kirkman, Lowe, &
Gibson, 2006; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Kwok & Tadesse,
2006; Sekely & Collins, 1988; Slangen, 2006; Tihanyi,
Griffith, & Russell, 2005). Research in the corporate
finance capital structure literature also investigates the in-
fluence of cultural variables on international capital structure
(Chui, Lloyd, & Kwok, 2002; Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur,
2000; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Sekely & Collins, 1988).
These studies suggest that national culture may be an
important “missing piece” to the capital structure puzzle
(Chui et al., 2002). In spite of this, however, research on the
determinants of capital structure in the SME literature has
largely ignored the cultural dimension, even though culture
may be a more important element in the SME sector. This is
because, whilst the influence of the cultural dimension in the
corporate sector may be somewhat diluted because of inter-
national aspects of ownership and financial markets, the
implications of culture are much more powerful in the SME
sector. This is due to the closely held ownership structure of
firms in the sector, and because SMEs generally access local
sources of financing.In this paper, we seek to add to the literature by investi-
gating the role of culture in explaining the capital structure of
SMEs. A number of specific research questions are posed:
a. Do capital structures differ across countries?
b. To what extent is capital structure determined by firm
characteristics, and industry sector?
c. What are the inter-country differences in firm character-
istic, and sectoral effects?
d. Controlling for firm and industry effects, to what extent is
capital structure determined by (3) institutional factors,
and (4) cultural factors.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2, we describe Hofstede’s measures of cultural rela-
tivism and formulate hypotheses. In doing so, we focus
particularly on the role of culture and other variables that are
related to culture. In Section 3, we present our data, describe
our methodology and formalise our tests. Section 4 contains
our findings and Section 5 draws together our conclusions.
2. Culture and capital structure in related research
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005: p. 4, p. 434) state that
“.Culture consists of the unwritten rules of the social game. It
is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes
the members of one group or category of people from the
others”. By studying organisations in a wide number of
countries, Hofstede (2001) developed a number of measures of
culture, including power distance, individuality, masculinity,
uncertainty avoidance, and short- and long-term orientation. He
employed these measures in investigating cultural relativism,
which explores “.cultural differences between societies, their
roots, and their consequences” (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005: p.
6, p. 434). Whilst these measures have been employed in a
large number of studies across a wide range of disciplines, they
have not been previously considered in empirical SME
financing research. Each measure is now considered in turn:2.1. Power distancePower distance scores inform us about dependence re-
lationships in a country. It is defined as the extent to which the
less powerful members of institutions and organisations within
a country expect and accept that power is distributed un-
equally. (The way power is distributed is usually explained
from the behaviour of the more powerful members e the
leaders rather than those led). In those countries with a high
power distance score, there is more deference to authority.
Banks could be thought of as being the more powerful
organisation, with SMEs being the weaker, subordinate orga-
nisation (After all, the SMEs go to the banks requesting
funding e banks are in the position of authority). Chui et al.
(2002) find that higher degrees of Schwartz and Sagiv’s
(1995) ‘mastery’ (which could approximate Hofstede’s
power distance) are associated with lower debt ratios. Addi-
tionally, in small power distance states “subordinates expect to
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distance states may have a more consultative role with the
banks e that they can at least bargain or negotiate their debt
agreements with the banks. Therefore, one would arguably
expect that this gives them access to higher levels of debt, or at
least to negotiate for loans e much more than it does in higher
power distance countries. It is hypothesised, therefore, that
There is an inverse relationship between power distance
and debt.2.2. IndividualismIndividualism pertains to societies in which the ties be-
tween individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after
himself and his immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite
pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout
people’s lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for
unquestioning loyalty.
Gleason et al. (2000) argue from Hirshleifer and Thakor
(1992) that cultures with high individuality tend to be associ-
ated with managers looking after their own interests and
enhancing their reputation. Therefore, they are likely to choose
lower debt in order to maximise success. Personal freedom is an
important component of the individualist pole, suggesting that
SME owners do not wish to have high levels of debt. Addi-
tionally, as “autonomy is the ideal”, this suggests that firm
owners in highly individualistic societies will finance the firm
with equity as much as possible. Thus, we hypothesise:
There is an inverse relationship between individualism and
debt.2.3. Masculinity“A society is called masculine when emotional gender roles
are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough,
and focused on material success, whereas women are sup-
posed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the
quality of life” (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005: p. 120, p. 434).
De Jong and Semenov (2002) argue that the degree of
masculinity is synonymous with support for competitive pro-
cesses and outcomes and associated with greater stock market
depth. This suggests the possibility that Hofstede’s (2001)
measure of the degree of masculinity might well have impli-
cations for the capital structure of SMEs by influencing
the appetite of owner-managers for debt and possibly
for long-term rather than short-term debt. SME owners
pursuing growth may have a greater appetite for debt, and
greater disregard for agency considerations. Therefore, we
hypothesise:
There is a positive relationship between masculinity and
debt.Uncertainty avoidanceUncertainty avoidance is the extent to which the members
of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknownsituations. It is well established in the literature that SME
owners desire to avoid uncertainty, and have an overriding
goal to retain control of the firm. Additionally, Chui et al.
(2002) find that higher degrees of ‘conservatism’ (which
could approximate Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance) are
associated with lower corporate debt ratios. In addition,
Gleason et al. (2000) argue that because higher debt leads to
greater risks of corporate bankruptcy, higher uncertainty
avoidance should lead to lower levels of debt in corporate
capital structures. Therefore, we hypothesise that:
Uncertainty avoidance is negatively related with debt.
Overall, our review of prior research on the role of culture
in capital structure points to the possibility that culture also
has a role to play in explaining the capital structure of SMEs.
Given that Hofstede’s (2001) cultural characteristics have not
yet been included in empirical work on SME capital structure,
it is to this that we now turn. There are, of course, alternative
frameworks of measuring national culture and psychic dis-
tance, such as the Schwartz measure and the Globe Project
(Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; House, Javidan, Hanges, &
Dorfman, 2002; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006), but most re-
searchers who have examined national culture have used
Hofstede’s measures.3. Data and methodology
Data for our study was sourced in the Bureau Van Dijk
Amadeus database. Our study concentrates on a number of
countries that are grouped as follows: the Scandinavian countries
including Finland, Norway and Sweden; Continental nations
including France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland; the
Southern European nations including Spain, Portugal, and
Greece; Ireland and the UK, and a sole Eastern European
representative, Romania. Data with over 90,000 firm-level ob-
servations was extracted for the years 2002e2008 inclusive.
Dependent and independent variables selected to test hypotheses
developed in the previous section are described in Table 1, and
Table 2 provides summary descriptive statistics for dependent
variables. None of the cultural variables has, to our knowledge,
been investigated in empirical SME capital structure studies
heretofore.
Whilst the principal aim of this paper is to investigate po-
tential cultural influences on SME capital structure, we also
conduct an examination of firm, industry and institutional
variables. Firm-characteristic variables are selected with
reference to prior research, as Hall, Hutchinson, and
Michaelas (2000: p. 300) note that: “From consideration of
the previous studies of the determinants of the capital structure
of small enterprises it becomes clear that profitability, growth,
asset structure, size and age and possibly industry are, prima
facie, likely to be related to capital structure.” The objective of
these tests is to expand the literature on cross-country studies,
investigate the extent to which industry and country specific
variables influence capital structure, and provide a more
complete set of variables than employed in previous large
scale empirical studies.
Table 1
Description of variables employed in regression models.
Variable Description of variable
STD Short term debt to total assets. Short term debt is defined as the
debt repayable within one year, including bank overdraft, loans,
and other current liabilities.
LTD Long term debt to total assets. Long term debt includes debt
payable beyond one year.
AGE Age of the firm in years from founding
SIZE Natural log of total assets of the firm.
FIXASS Ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
GROWTH Ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Intangible assets
include: research and development expenditure, trademarks,
patents and copyrights.
PROF Ratio of profit/loss before tax to operating revenue.
COLL Collection period (days)
CRED Credit period (days)
UNCA Natural log of the Hofstede Uncertainty avoidance index.
INDV Natural log of the Hofstede Individuality index.
POWD Natural log of the Hofstede Power distance index.
MASC Natural log of the Hofstede Masculinity index.
FREE Natural Log of the Fraser Institute measure of Economic
Freedom
LEGPROP Natural Log of the Fraser Institute measure of legal structure
and security of property rights
SM Natural Log of the Fraser Institute measure access to sound
money
REGQUAL Natural Log of World Bank measure of regulatory quality
(REGQUAL) (Kaufmann et al 2009).
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defined by total assets (SIZE ), firm age (AGE ), asset structure
(FIXASS ), the firm’s growth opportunities (GROWTH ), its
profit margin (PROF ), the collection period for its debts
(COLL) and its credit period (CRED) (the latter two are
included only in the analysis of short-term debt). These are
presented in vector (1).Table 2





Masc Powd Unca Indv
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Belgium 2611 .135 .285 25 51 68 75
Finland 955 .149 .296 26 33 59 63
France 24,485 .043 .321 43 68 86 71
Germany 1509 .284 .191 66 35 65 67
Greece 3056 .063 .294 57 60 112 35
Ireland 377 .093 .272 68 28 35 70
Norway 5029 .094 .324 8 31 50 69
Portugal 7670 .132 .306 31 63 104 27
Romania 6258 .008 .325 42 90 90 30
Spain 30,394 .122 .338 42 57 86 51
Sweden 513 .103 .405 5 31 29 71
Switzerland 285 .192 .300 70 34 58 68
United
Kingdom
10,689 .137 .137 66 35 35 89
Notes. In column 2, ‘No obs’ denotes the number of firms per country. In
columns (3) and (4), ‘Long-term debt’ and ‘short-term debt’ are country av-
erages of the ratios of short and long-term debt to total assets. In columns
(5)e(8), ‘Masc’,’ Powd’, ‘Unca’ and ‘Indiv’ denote respectively the country
measures of Hofstede’s masculinity, power distance, uncertainty avoidance
and individualism.Firm¼ FðAGE; SIZE; FIXASS; GROWTH; PROF;
COLL; CREDÞ
ð1Þ
Industrial classifications are grouped into six sectoral
groupings, namely primary (PRIMARY ), manufacturing
(MANU ), Retail and Wholesale (RETWHOL), Transportation
and storage (LOGISTICS), Information, communication and
professional services (ICTSERV), and Other services (OTH-
SERV). These are presented in vector (2).
Ind ¼ GðPRIMARY; MANU; RETWHOL; LOGISTICS;
ICTSERV; OTHSERVÞ
ð2Þ
Our institutional strength variables in vector (3) include the
Fraser Institute measures of economic freedom (FREE )
(Gwartney & Lawson, 2003), legal structure and security of
property rights (LEGPROP), access to sound money (SM ),
and the World Bank measure of regulatory quality
(REGQUAL) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009).
Instit ¼ IðFREE; LEGPROP; SM; REGQUALÞ ð3Þ
Our cultural variables are from Hofstede’s (2001) measures
of the degree of masculinity (MASC ), the degree of in-
dividuality (INDV), the degree of power distance (POWD) and
the degree of uncertainty avoidance (UNCA).
Culture ¼ CðUNCA; INDV; MASC; POWDÞ ð4Þ
Following standard practice in the literature, we estimate
our models using random-effects generalised linear regression
(GLS) estimation with robust standard errors.
We first estimate our benchmark model employing only the
firm-level variables in vector (1). The estimating equation for
this model is as follows.
DTAit ¼ ai0 þ ai1AGEþ ai2SIZEþ ai3FIXASSþ ai4GROWTH
þ ai5PROFþ ai6COLLþ ai7CREDþ εit
ð5Þ
Here, DTA denotes the debt-to-assets ratio, and the super-
script i short-term and long-term debt-to-assets ratio. In
essence, therefore, we estimate equation (5) twice e once for
the short-term debt-to-assets ratio, and again for the long-term
debt-to-assets ratio. The results are presented in model (1) of
Table 3 for the short-term debt-to-assets ratio, and in model (5)
in Table 4 for the long-term debt-to-assets ratio.
Industry sectoral dummies in vector (2). The primary sector
(PRIMARY ) is selected as the reference group because pre-
vious research suggests that the capital structure of these firms
differs significantly from other sectors. The resulting equation
to be estimated is as follows.
DTAit ¼ bi0þFirmþ bi1MANUþ bi2RETWHOL
þ bi3LOGISTICSþ bi4ICTSERV þ bi5OTHSERV þ zit
ð6Þ
Here, Firm represents the estimated coefficients from the
vector of firm-level variables in equation (5). Results from
estimating (6) are presented in model (2) of Table 3 for the
Table 3
The determinants of SME capital structure: short-term debt/assets ratio.
Explanatory variable Symbol Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coeff. P Coeff. P Coeff. r Coeff. r
Firm characteristics
Age AGE .0005 .000 .0003 .000 .0003 .000 .0004 .000
Total assets SIZE .0356 .000 .0331 .000 .0305 .000 .0292 .000
Asset structure FIXASS .0678 .000 .0720 .000 .0707 .000 .0701 .000
Growth opportunities GROWTH .0088 .500 .0407 .002 .0419 .002 .0401 .002
Profitability PROF .0001 .456 .0001 .591 .0001 .610 .0001 .602
Collection period COLL .0004 .000 .0003 .000 .0003 .000 .0003 .000
Credit period CRED .0006 .000 .0006 .000 .0006 .000 .0006 .000
Industry sectors
Manufacturing MANU .0316 .000 .0291 .000 .0279 .000
Retail and wholesale RETWHOL .0327 .000 .0308 .000 .0305 .000
Transport & storage LOGISTICS .0253 .002 .0257 .002 .0262 .001
Professional servs. ICTSERV .0741 .000 .0711 .002 .0688 .000
Other Services OTHSERV .0658 .000 .0642 .000 .0651 .000
Institutional strength
Economic freedom FREE .0175 .322 .0147 .627
Legal & property rights LEGPROP .0127 .000 .0058 .262
Access to sound money SM .0083 .217 .0343 .006
Regulatory quality REGQUAL .0591 .007 .0985 .008
Culture
Uncertainty avoidance UNCA .1565 .000
Individuality INDV .0197 .267
Power distance POWD .1267 .000
Masculinity MASC .0458 .000
Constant .6256 .000 .6045 .000 .5165 .000 .3311 .122
R2 .0798 .1090 .1106 .1156
Wald Chi2 2402.5 .000 2885.8 .000 2914.8 .000 3006.8 .000
Notes. This table reports the random effects panel estimates for the ratio of short-term debt to total assets using 51,131 observations over the 7-year period from
2002 to 2008. Model (1) includes only the firm characteristic variables, model (2) adds industry sector effects, model (3) includes institutional strength and model
(4) cultural variables. All variables are defined in Table 1.
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the long-term debt-to-assets ratio.
We next add the institutional strength variables from vector
(3), giving the estimating equation (7) with Ind representing
the estimated coefficients from the vector of industry sector
dummies in equation (6).
DTAit ¼ di0þFirmþ Indþ di1FREEþ di2LEGPROPþ di3SM
þ di4REGQUALþ xit
ð7Þ
The results are presented in model (3) of Table 3 for the
short-term debt-to-assets ratio, and in model (7) in Table 4 for
the long-term debt-to-assets ratio.
Finally, our specification in equation (8) adds the cultural
variables to the firm, industry and institutional strength effects
in models (3) and (7), with Inst representing the estimated
coefficients from the vector of institutional strength variables
in equation (7).
DTAit ¼ di0þFirmþ Indþ Instþ di1UNCAþ di2INDV
þ di3POWDþ di4MASCþ xit ð8Þ
The results from estimating equation (8) are presented in
model (4) of Table 3 for the short-term debt-to-assets ratio,and in model (8) in Table 4 for the long-term debt-to-assets
ratio.4. Results
The results from our regression models employing short-
and long-term debt as dependent variables are presented in
Tables 3 and 4 respectively, and discussion of results is
organised according to the categorisation of variables
employed.4.1. Firm characteristicsAll four models employing short- and long-term debt as the
dependent variable indicate a negative relationship between
debt and age. This result is consistent with previous empirical
studies, and provides further support for the stages model and
the financial growth life cycle theory (Berger & Udell, 1998,
Mac An Bhaird & Lucey, 2010). It indicates that firms
become less reliant on sources of external funding over time as
debt is retired and firms become increasingly dependent on
retained profits (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Relationships be-
tween firm size and debt e negative for short-term and posi-
tive for long-term debt e are also consistent with previous
studies. The negative relationship between short-term debt and
Table 4
The determinants of SME capital structure: long-term debt/assets ratio.
Explanatory variable Symbol Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
Coeff. r Coeff. r Coeff. r Coeff. r
Firm characteristics
Age AGE .0010 .000 .0010 .000 .0004 .000 .0008 .000
Log of total assets SIZE .0156 .000 .0157 .000 .0127 .000 .0130 .000
Asset structure FIXASS .2242 .000 .2211 .000 .2165 .000 .2156 .000
Growth opportunities GROWTH .0114 .249 .0153 .125 .0307 .002 .0331 .001
Profitability PROF .0000 .505 .0000 .490 .0000 .425 .0000 .425
Industry sectors
Manufacturing MANU .0105 .032 .0143 .003 .0140 .004
Retail and wholesale RETWHOL .0150 .002 .0130 .008 .0131 .007
Transport & storage LOGISTICS .0093 .150 .0104 .102 .0107 .090
Professional servs. ICTSERV .0217 .000 .0235 .000 .0261 .000
Other services OTHSERV .0200 .005 .0149 .033 .0162 .019
Institutional strength
Economic freedom FREE .0578 .000 .0300 .291
Legal & property rights LEGPROP .0064 .009 .0173 .000
Access to sound money SM .0514 .000 .0033 .742
Regulatory quality REGQUAL .1138 .000 .2623 .440
Culture
Uncertainty avoidance UNCA .0244 .003
Individuality INDV .0863 .000
Power distance POWD .1915 .000
Masculinity MASC .0663 .000
Constant .0625 .000 .0515 .000 .1421 .070 1.041 .000
R2 .0927 .0941 .1154 .1211
Wald Chi2 3496.25 .000 3531.8 .000 4075.3 .000 4288.4 .000
Notes. This table reports the random effects panel estimates for the ratio of long-term debt to total assets using 79,862 observations over the 7-year period from
2002 to 2008. Model (1) includes only the firm characteristic variables, model (2) adds industry sector effects, model (3) includes institutional strength and model
(4) cultural variables. All variables are defined in Table 2.
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heavily reliant on short-term debt as per Garcia-Teruel and
Martinez-Solano (2007), as firms may be unwilling or un-
able to employ long-term debt because of higher transaction
costs. Cassar and Holmes (2003) suggest that larger firms, by
contrast, may be offered, and employ, more long-term debt
because of scale effects. A further reason for the observed
positive relationship may be collateral effects, as the proxy
employed for firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Firms with greater amounts of collateralisable assets have
capacity for higher long-term debt ratios ceteris paribus, and
tend to match the maturity of their debt with that of their assets
(Bartholdy & Mateus, 2008). This explanation is confirmed by
the significant positive relationship between asset structure
(the ratio of fixed to total assets) and long-term debt. This
finding supports the proposition of Bartholdy and Mateus
(2008), that asset structure is the single most important
determinant of SME capital structures. The negative rela-
tionship between short-term debt and asset structure suggests
that firms’ short-term debt is not secured on fixed assets, either
because of insufficient fixed assets, or because it is secured on
other (short-term) collateral, or it remains unsecured. The
implication in the former case is that firms employ inappro-
priate sources of finance (short-term rather than long-term
debt) due to insufficient lien-free collateralisable fixed assets.
Relationships between growth opportunities (the ratio of
intangible assets to total assets) are positive for long-term debtand negative for short-term debt, although a number of co-
efficients are not statistically significant. These results suggest
that firms with sufficient lien-free collateralisable assets can
access debt to finance their growth. The positive relationships
observed in models (5) to (8) are consistent with Sogorb Mira
(2005) who explain that the type of assets linked to growth
opportunities may be long-term in nature, and thus the matu-
rity of debt matches that of the assets. Negative relationships
between short- and long-term debt and profitability are
consistent with previous studies such as Daskalakis and
Psillaki (2008), Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar (2007),
Sogorb Mira (2005) indicating that firms employ debt when
retained profits are insufficient for investment projects. Results
for all models are statistically insignificant, however. The re-
lationships between short-term debt and collection and credit
periods are positive and negative respectively. These results
are intuitive, as firms’ short-term debt increases with time to
receive payments. Conversely, short-term debt requirements
diminish with length of credit proffered by creditors.4.2. Industry sectorsConsistent with Hall et al. (2000), results suggest signifi-
cant inter-industry differences in the levels of short-term and
long-term debt employed. Statistically significant differences
in coefficients for models (2) to (4) indicate that PRIMARY
firms employ more short-term debt than those in the
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other sectors. Coefficients in models (6) to (8) confirm inter-
industry differences, as PRIMARY firms employ more long-
term debt than all sectors except LOGISTICS. This result
supports the proposition that there are persistent differences in
industry debt ratios over time (Harris & Raviv, 1990, 1991),
and that these differences are the result of inter-industry var-
iations in asset structure (Bartholdy & Mateus, 2008). Whilst
these results support the view that sources of financing
employed vary significantly across sectors (Hall et al., 2000),
we cannot dismiss the conclusion that firm specific charac-
teristics are more important than structural characteristics of
industry (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993), or that financial and
strategy variables have greater explanatory power than in-
dustry specific effects (Jordan, Lowe, & Taylor, 1998).4.3. Institutional characteristicsOur results suggest that some institutional strength vari-
ables are important for firms in accessing short-term, but
particularly long-term debt. Relationships between debt and
FREE in models (3) and (7) suggest that economic freedom is
positively related to short-term and long-term debt respec-
tively, although these results are not statistically significant
and there is a considerable change in sign in models (4) and
(8). Legal structure and security of property rights (LEG-
PROP) is positively and significantly related to both short-term
and long-term debt. This result is intuitive, and is consistent
with previous literature Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) The
variable ‘Access to sound money’ is negatively related with
short-term and long-term debt in models (3), (7) and (8),
although this effect is reversed significantly in model (4),
which has a positive coefficient. The latter result is not un-
expected, although the inconsistent, statistically insignificant
results preclude a definitive conclusion. Finally, regulatory
quality is negatively related with short-term debt, but is
positively related with long-term debt. The latter results are
consistent with previous studies, although one of the co-
efficients is not statistically significant. Overall, it is difficult
to make strong conclusions on the effects of institutional
characteristics because of the lack of statistical significance in
the short-term models, and the sign inconsistencies between
models (3) and (4).4.4. Culture variablesOur results for models employing cultural variables show
that the cultural variables are statistically significant with two
exceptions, and the effects for long-term debt are generally
greater than for short-term debt. Uncertainty avoidance is
negatively related to long-term debt as hypothesised, although
the relationship with short-term debt is positive. This is
unexpected. This could be explained by the conjecture that
long-term debt is relatively riskier for the SME owner than
short-term debt ceteris paribus, and the longer term commit-
ment, including provision of personal assets as collateral to
secure long-term debt. It also may be related to the Kwok andTadesse (2006) finding of more bank reliance. Individualism is
negatively related with long-term debt as hypothesised, and
positively related with short-term debt, although the latter
result is statistically insignificant. The relationship between
power distance and debt is negative as hypothesised, although
the coefficient for long-term debt is greater than that for short-
term debt. This result is consistent with the individualistic
view that “autonomy is the ideal”, providing further support
for the well documented desire for independence of SME
owners. Masculinity is positively related with long-term debt
as hypothesised, but negatively related with short-term debt.
These results suggest that SME owners in societies with a high
degree of masculinity have a greater appetite for debt to
finance growth, with a preference for long-term rather than
short-term debt.
5. Summary and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to expand and broaden the litera-
ture on SME financing by investigating the role of cultural
variables in determining capital structures. Employing a
database of over 90,000 observations across 13 countries, we
find that significant cross-country differences in capital
structure are partly explained by cultural variables. These ef-
fects are generally stronger than firm-characteristic, industry
or institutional effects. Uncertainty avoidance is negatively
related to long-term debt, confirming SME owners’ desire to
avoid heightened business risk, and interference from debt
providers (Esperanca et al., 2003, Cressy, 2006) This result
highlights the intention to avoid adverse consequences of
financial distress, including the considerable negative effects
on the owner’s reputation and self-esteem Such consequences
may not be as severe in relation to short-term debt, for which
the result is converse. The negative relationship between long-
term debt and the degree of individuality suggests that issues
of “.individual freedom and self-actualization.” (Hofstede
& Hofstede, 2005: p. 109, p. 434) are important for SME
owners in seeking to maintain autonomy and retain control.
Levels of short-term debt affect these considerations to a lesser
degree, which may explain the contrary result in relation to
this source. Indeed, employing short-term debt rather than
long-term debt increases flexibility and reduces autonomy-
restricting adherence to covenants, restrictions and increased
monitoring. The negative relationships between power dis-
tance and debt suggest that SMEs in small power distance
states have a more consultative role with financial institutions.
We propose that the ability to engage in negotiations for debt
financing facilitates greater access to debt, or at least the op-
portunity to negotiate debt facilities. The positive relationship
between masculinity and long-term debt suggests that the
values of “.challenge, earnings, recognition and
advancement.” (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005: p. 132, p. 434)
result in firm owners pursuing growth demonstrating a greater
appetite for debt. We propose that this view is consistent with
the contrary result observed for short-term debt. Indeed,
similar to results observed for the Uncertainty avoidance and
Individuality measures, these effects highlight the complex
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capital structures, particularly the decision to employ long-
term versus short-term debt. The magnitude of coefficients
for models employing cultural variables suggests that these
measures are important in determining capital structure, and
are significantly larger than those for models investigating
firm, industry and institutional characteristics. Results for
models employing firm-characteristic variables are broadly
consistent with previous studies, highlighting the role of firm
age, size, asset structure, growth opportunities and profitability
in determining debt ratios. A novel result of our study is that
the relationships between short-term debt and collection and
credit periods are positive and negative respectively. Results
indicate that short-term debt increase with debtors’ time to
payment, and diminishes with length of credit proffered by
creditors. Whilst this result is not unexpected, it is heretofore
unreported in large scale studies in the SME literature.
Whilst the inclusion of institutional variables captures a
significant amount of cross-country differences in financial,
legal and regulatory systems and structures, there may be
notable variations in debt ratios depending on whether a
financial system is bank-based (Germany, for example) or
market-based (United Kingdom, for example Demigurc-Kunt
and Levine (1999). Additionally, differences in banking sys-
tems and institutions across countries can potentially account
for variations in capital structures. Hofstede and Hofstede
(2005: p. 19, p. 434) argues that institutions also follow
“.mental programs in the way they adapt to local culture”.
Thus, institutions are also subject to the mores and conven-
tions of national cultures. In order to fully comprehend the
influence of legal and financial systems on capital structures, it
is necessary to understand the societies in which they operate.
Consistent with previous studies there are significant sec-
toral differences in short- and long-term debt ratios. Firms in
the primary sector employ higher levels of long-term debt than
all sectors, and use less short-term debt than all sectors apart
from the manufacturing and retail and wholesale sectors. This
result is not unexpected, although it is not possible to discern
the primacy of sectoral over firm-level variables. Institutional
variables were included in the study to capture cross-country
differences in access to money, regulatory quality, economic
freedom and legal and property rights. These factors could
possibly dominate and/or override cultural effects of financing.
Consistent with previous research legal and property rights
and regulatory quality are positively related with long-term
debt. Other results are less conclusive, suggesting that these
issues have less relevance in relation to levels of short-term
debt.
The importance of cultural considerations in SME capital
structure has implications for policy makers. For example,
SMEs in high uncertainty avoidance countries preference
short-term relative to long-term debt. These financing prefer-
ences may expose firms to excessive risk, and weaken the
sustainability of the SME sector. Policies designed to improve
access to finance or improve the capital mix may not succeed
because of the deep and powerful consequences of cultural
influences. Even if governments attempt to impose policies inrelation to provision of SME finance, they may not succeed, as
they will be thwarted by the over-arching effects of culture.
Thus, policy makers must be aware of these potential pitfalls
when designing initiatives. This does not mean such policy
initiatives will fail e intelligent policy makers will be able to
utilise cultural factors to design initiatives, which will succeed.
Our paper has implications for further research. Firstly, there
remains the need for broad cross-country SME studies,
notwithstanding the burgeoning of research in recent years.
Secondly, researchers should examine the implications of these
cultural factors in bank-based systems, such as Germany, in
contrast with countries which have market-based systems, such
as the UK. Thirdly, researchers might conduct a comparative
study employing the Schwartz and GLOBE dimensions of na-
tional culture. Additionally, researchers could conduct more
sophisticated statistical tests on this data which will result in
improvements in efficiency. Finally, a research agenda of mixed
methods, deploying qualitative as well as quantitative studies to
deeply probe how cultural norms impact would be most useful.References
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